The origin of art exists between the artist and their work. The work is the origin of the artist; the artist is the origin of the work. They cannot be without each other. Heidegger questions, “But can art be an origin at all? Where and how does art occur?” (Heidegger 17). To understand the origin of art, Heidegger states we must understand the nature of art. Art must be inferable to the work, the viewer or artist must be able to derive a reason from the art. What art is can be gathered from a comparative examination of art works. But this nature of art is no longer arrived by a collective view of characteristics and concepts of works of art. Works of art is familiar to everyone. Art can be found in the streets, peoples’ homes, or galleries. Through art, we connect their untouched actuality with work that is naturally present in things. All works of art have a thingly character that creates the nature of art.
“There is something stony in a work of architecture, wooden in a carving, colored in a painting, spoken in a linguistic work, sonorous in a musical composition” (Heidegger 19). There is undoubtedly a thingly element to art and its nature. However, the work of art is above this thingly element. Art is a thing that is made, but it says something different then the mere thing itself. The otherness that is brought together with the thing that is made, manifests something more than what was created; it is an allegory. This story that the art creates is a bringing together. In Greek terms, this bringing or putting together is translated as symbállein.
Allegory and symbol create a conceptual frame for a channel of vision for the art. The thingly element of the art is the substructure for the piece. It brings an authenticity and handicraft to the art. The viewers’ goal is to acquire an immediate and full reality of the work of art. But first, we must understand the thingly element of art in order to determine whether it is a thing, or simply a thing which something else adheres.
Thing & Work
In order to understand the truth of the thing in a work of art is to understand the thingly character of the thing. The “thing-in-itself” could be seen as god or the cloud in the sky. If there is an applied name, even if these things don’t appear, then these things must exist. All beings are called things. Everything is considered a thing and Heidegger suggests the “mere thing” is simply a thing and isn’t seen as anything else. With a western thought, we have interpreted a thingness and reduced the thing to simple properties. There are properties within the thing, especially in the mere thing. Heidegger uses a block of granite for an example. It is hard, bulky, heavy, shapeless, rough, colored, partly dull and partly shiny. We take in all of the characteristics of the granite and we created these traits that become the stone itself. “A thing, as everyone thinks [they know], is that around which the properties have assembled” (Heidegger 22). We use these characteristics and properties to create the core of the thing. The Greeks have called it to hypokeimenon, where the core of the thing is something lying at the ground of the thing, something that was always there. The characteristics are called ta symbebekota, which has always turned up along with the given core of the thing. The Greeks experienced the thing specifically through the sense of presence, the experience of the being of beings. However, these translations sell the Greek language short. Heidegger quotes, “The rootlessness of Western thought begins with the translation” (Heidegger 23).
This loss in translation corresponds to our natural outlook of things. We rely on the current interpretation of the thing; we see the thing as a bearer of its characteristics, a strict sense that holds onto the mere thing and of any being. This modern thing-concept always fits each thing. We no longer see the thing as its own being, we instead make an assault upon it. To avoid this objective assault on a thing, the thing must be in a free field to display its thingly character. Everything that might interpose itself between us and the thing must first be set aside; only then do we yield ourselves to the undisguised presence of the thing. Heidegger does mention that we don’t need to an arranged situation in order to fully understand the thing. “The situation always prevails” (Heidegger 25). The sense of light, hearing, and touch convey the senses of color, sound, and hardness. Things move us bodily, it is the aistheton. This Greek term means to be situated with the senses.
But when considering what we are searching for, the thingly character of the thing leaves us lost with the thing-concept. We never truly perceive a throng of sensations through the thing, such as tones and noises. For example, when we are sitting in a house, we may hear a whistle through the chimney or the rain patter against the shingles. These sensations are far away but the things (the chimney) are much closer. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, we must divert from them and listen abstractly. This assault on things is due to our attempt to bring the thing within the greatest possible proximity to us. The thing must be remained in its self-containment; accepted in its own constancy.
Things are composed of matter (hule) and form (morphe). The distinction between the matter and the form of the thing is the conceptual schema that is used. Heidegger defines form, in this essay’s context, “as the distribution and arrangement of the material parts in spatial locations, resulting in a particular form” (Heidegger 27). The form of the thing determines the arrangement of the matter. The formative act and the choice of material creates a usefulness of the thing. The usefulness of the thing’s matter and form becomes the equipment. Equipment, just like a mere thing, is self-contained, but it doesn’t have the character of taking shape like that of a mere thing. For example, we can see granite as something else. It can be seen as earth, as a countertop, as a tombstone. But a shoe can only be seen as a shoe. Equipment is half of the thing, it is characterized by thingliness and yet still something more. Heidegger quotes, “Equipment has a peculiar position intermediate between thing and work, assuming that such a calculated ordering of them is permissible” (Heidegger 28).
We put equipment to work. It gets worn out, used up, and wasted away. It becomes normal. When we consider shoes as equipment and art as a form of revealing the truth, we must look at Van Gogh’s painting titled “Shoes.” In Van Gogh’s painting, he shows the truth of what equipment is. The shoes he painted reveals the aletheia, or in Greek terms, unconcealedness. This is the nature of art; the truth of beings setting itself to work. Van Gogh’s painting of “Shoes” is a contradiction to modern art by revealing a sense of truth and ignores the essence of beauty. These shoes portray the matter and form of the thing. It even shows the declining health of equipment through usefulness. Fine art by itself shouldn’t be considered beautiful, but instead fine art should produce the beautiful. Heidegger states, “Truth, in contrast, belongs to logic. Beauty, however, is reserved for aesthetics” (Heidegger 35). It is important to see art as truth setting itself to work.
The barriers of our preoccupations must fall away, and our pseudo concepts be set aside. It may be challenging to place and prepare ourselves for a situation that creates a path that leads to a determination of the thingly feature within the work. Art work opens up in its own way through deconcealing and the truth of beings. But then we must question, what is truth itself that it sometimes comes to pass as art? “What is this setting-itself-to-work?” (Heidegger 38).
The origin of art can only be seen through art. We seek the reality of the work; art work universally displays a thingly character. However, it is hard to fully see work as a thing by itself. We force work into a preconceived framework that obstructs our access to the work-being of the work. In order to fully understand the work, it is necessary to remove the work from all relations to something other than itself. Artwork must be released and taken in as a pure self-subsistence. Great art destroys itself in the creative process, allowing the work to emerge.
When we do come across art, it is usually situated in a public or private collection standing with other works of art. “But are the here in themselves as the works they themselves are, or are they not rather here as objects of the art industry?” (Heidegger 39). The art industry is full of critics and connoisseurs, dealers supplying the market, and art historians studying the works as objects of a science. So can we view art as things themselves? It is true that there is a withdrawal and sterilization that occurs when removing works of art from their intended world. This is considered as world-withdrawal and world-decay, which can never be undone. If artwork doesn’t belong in museums, where does work belong? The work belongs as work, uniquely opened up within its realm. As stated before, there is a truth within work, but if work is now placed outside of its world, is there still truth?
Truth means the nature of the true. The term aletheia brings truth through the unconcealed. However, the modern age has warped the meaning of aletheia. Today, truth means an agreement or a conformity of knowledge with fact. We situate truth with correctness and certainty. Heidegger quotes, “This nature of truth which is familiar to us, stands and falls with truth as unconcealedness of beings” (Heidegger 50).
The term unconcealedness is brought forth through the being. Beings are things made up of humans, gifts, sacrifices, animals, plants, equipment, and works. Through being, there is a sense of concealed. Concealment can be a refusal or a dissembling; there is no certainty whether concealment is one or the other. Concealment has the ability to conceal and dissemble itself. Heidegger states, “This means: the open place in midst of beings, the clearing, is never a rigid stage with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings runs its course” (Heidegger 52). Unconcealedness is never a mere existence, it is a happening. Unconcealedness or truth is neither an attribute or factual thing.
Going back to Van Gogh’s painting of the shoes, we obtain a sense of authenticity and simplicity. These shoes are engrossed in their nature, making the work direct and engaging to all beings. This can then reveal the truth of the work of art. But how does a work essentially align with the nature of truth? If our modern interpretation of truth is flawed, what is truth? “How is it that art exists at all?” (Heidegger 55).
It is true that art is the origin of the art work and of the artist. “Origin is the source of the nature in which the being of an entity is present” (Heidegger 56). The reality of the work is defined by what is at work within the work through the happening of the truth. This happening is brought forth through the process of creation. When a work is becoming a work, it can be seen as a way which truth is becoming entwined within the work. Truth occurs in opposition of clearing and concealing. Truth can be seen as the un-truth, just like that of unconcealedness. The establishment of truth is the bringing forth of a being, such as never was before and will never come again. Bringing forth places this being in the open, which then brings truth.
Art allows truth to originate. Art is the spring that leaps to the truth of what a thing or work of art is. It brings something into being from out of its source of its nature. This is what origin means, or in German, Ursprung, which literally means primal leap. The origin of a work of art is the origin of both the creators and the preservers. Art is, by nature, an origin. It has a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, it becomes historical. Heidegger quotes, “We inquire in this way in order to be able to ask more truly whether art is or is nor an origin in our historical existence, whether and under what conditions it can and must be an origin” (Heidegger 75). Such a reflection allows an indispensable preparation for the becoming of art. A preparation of its space for art, their way for the creators, and their location for the preservers.
Heidegger, M. (2013). Poetry, Language, Thought. New York City, NY: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.